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FAMILY BACKGROUND AND OPTIMAL
SCHOOLING DECISIONS
Edward Lazear*
T HEassumption that individuals "optimize"
is one of the most important engines of eco-
nomic analysis. Recent years have seen a num-
ber of attempts to examine this assumption in
more detail. Leibenstein (1966) introduced, and a
recent note by Stigler (1976) examines, the no-
tion of"X-efficiency" or the ability to operate on
the production function. Radner and Rothschild
(1975) discuss the equilibrium of markets charac-
terized by firms that operate according to rules of
thumb. The industrial organization literature is
full of analyses that assume behavior other than
profit maximization. (See Simon (1957), Wil-
liamson (1966), and Marris and Wood (1971), for
example.)
In this paper, another aspect of optimizing be-
havior is considered. Specifically,it asks
whether variations in levels of attained schooling
across groups can be explained by a model that
assumes that capital markets are perfect and that
individuals maximize wealth. It has long been
recognized that attained levels of schooling are
positively correlated with parental income.1 This
has led some to suggest that the ability to inter-
nally finance the acquisition of education tends to
perpetuate schooling and income inequality
across generations. Capital cost differences, it is
argued, may be a crucial variable in the explana-
tion of education and income variation.2 The
model set forth in this paper allows one to test for
capital cost differences across income groups.
Other things constant, evidence of very small
differences is found. We can reject with 95%
confidence that implicit borrowing costs to the
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rich are as little as 0.25 of a percentage point
lower than those for the poor. We can also reject
with the same level of confidence that those dif-
ferences are zero. The conclusion is, therefore,
that with 95% confidence the poor face implicit
borrowing costs that are greater than those for
the rich, but greater by an amount less than one-
quarter of a percentage point.
implications for policy vary considerably with
the source of intergroup differences. If the ex-
planation of the poor's relatively low levels of
attained schooling rests upon capital market im-
perfections, the wealth of these individuals (and
GNP) could be increased by the provision of
"subsidized" loans.3 On the other hand, if the
source of differential schooling levels is differen-
tial returns to schooling (because, say, of wage
discrimination), subsidized schooling would not
be the appropriate solution. Wealth of the disad-
vantaged group would be most efficiently in-
creased by policies designed to reduce labor
market discrimination.
The logic of the analysis proceeds as follows:
First, a model is constructed that allows estima-
tion of costs and returns to education for each
individual, based on the assumption that all indi-
viduals face the same borrowing rates. Given
costs and returns, one can obtain an optimal
wealth-maximizing level of education for each
individual. Differences between actually ac-
quired and wealth-maximizing levels of educa-
tion can then be calculated, and one can deter-
mine whether or not the residuals are systemat-
ically related to background variables. If, for ex-
ample, low-income individuals have a consis-
tently larger estimated wealth-maximizing level
of education than actual level, one could con-
clude either that returns to schooling differed
between groups or that capital market differ-
ences exist. The model allows these two explana-
tions to be distinguished. Since differential re-
This assumes, of course, that the government or agency
providing the subsidized loans possesses information on the
nature of the imperfection. A variant on this is suggested by
Freeman (1975). He argues that it is the state that discrimi-
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turns are caused by wage differences across
groups, the wealth-maximizing level can take
these labor market variations into account. Any
residual variation will be due to factors other
than differential wage rates, presumably capital
cost differences.4
I. A Wealth-Maximizing Model
In order to determine whether capital market
differences across individuals result in different
attained levels of schooling, it is necessary to
build a model that takes other causes of school-
ing variation into account. That is, differences in
schooling attainment can result from differences
in cost or from differences in returns. In this
model, we will take all differences in costs and
returns into account, except for those that may
result from capital cost variation. Initially, the
model will assume that capital costs are the same
across all individuals. If, in reality, poor individ-
uals face higher borrowing costs than rich indi-
viduals, the model will overpredict education for
the poor and underpredict for the rich. The sys-
tematic nature of the residuals will result from
capital cost rather than wage discrimination dif-
ferences because the model takes the latter into
account directly. The effect of the former, which
is unobservable, can be inferred from examina-
tion of the residuals.
The problem for the individual is to choose an
optimal amount of education, E, given his en-
dowment vector of attributes, S. These exoge-
nous attributes are expected to affect the indi-
vidual's cost of producing education, C(E,S), as
well as his returns to education. Let PE(S) be the
selling price" of a year of schooling. It is inter-
preted as the present value of the amount by
which earnings are increased over the lifetime as
the result of acquisition of an additional year of
schooling. FE(S) varies across individuals with
their attributes, but PEiS assumed to be constant
for any given individual across all years of
schooling.5 If C(E, S) and FE(S) are constructed
The wealth-maximizing framework allows one to distin-
guish between labor and capital market differences as expla-
nations for differential schooling levels. A simple regression
of schooling on independent variables where nonwhite mean
levels of the independent variables are multiplied by white
regression coefficients will not distinguish the two. (See Gil-
man (1965) for an analysis along those lines.)
This amounts to assuming that additional years of school-
ing produce slightly more units of human capital where a unit
so that they are in present value units at the
individual's time of birth, wealth is maximized by
selecting E to maximize
W =EFE(S)
—C(E,5) + Xe(S) (1)
where Xe(S) is endowed wealth in the absence of
schooling, If Cis strictly convex in E, monotoni-
cally increasing, and
aC(O,S)<FE(S),
then a maximum is obtained with E> 0 when
FE(S) —aC(E,S) — CE(E,S). (2)
Equation (2) states the obvious condition that
marginal cost is equal to marginal return.
If one knows the function C(E, 5), an individ-
ual's endowment, and his attained level of
schooling E, FE(S) can be inferred from (2), as-
suming optimization. This is illustrated in figure
1. Consider individual A with attributes 5A. The
attributes define a cost function C(E, SA). One
observes that the individual acquires EA years of
schooling. Since optimality insures that CE(EA,
SA) =PE(SA),FE(SA) is the slope of the line
tangent to C(E, SA) at point Q.Considerindivid-
ual B with attributes 5B' 5B is identical to 5A
except that the i°' component of SB is one unit
larger than the i°' component of 5A' B obtains EB
of education so FE(SB)equals the slope of the line
tangent to C(E, SB)at R.The difference FE(SB) —
PE(SA) isnow identified and is the market
shadow value of attribute i in returns to educa-
tion. The individual takes this value as given.
Once his attributes are known, his FE(S) is de-
termined. He simply moves to the point on his
cost curve where his market determined PE(S)
equals CE(E, S).6
Suppose it were the case that the C(E, S) func-
tion were known with certainty (say, from a
of human capital is defined such that its rental rate is con-
stant. The increase in the number of units of human capital
exactly affects the decline in value resulting from acquisition
later in life. This assumption does not imply a constant rate of
return, however, since costs may vary with E.
The assumption that Ps(S) is not a function of E is essential
for identification. This potentially verifiable assumption can-
not be independently tested in this model and remains one of
its shortcomings. An entire life history of earnings and labor
force participation appears necessary to answer that ques-
tion.
6Inthe language of Rosen (1974), the individual takes the
hedonic price surface as given. We are estimating the slope of
that surface.44 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
previous study). The knowledge of C(E, 5),
along with an individual's chosen E, allows iden-
tification of PE(S). That is, if the cost function is
already known, one can infer marginal returns by
examining the level of marginal cost which
necessarily equals marginal revenue at the cho-
sen equilibrium level of E. Thus, if the marginal
cost function is already known or easier to esti-
mate than the marginal return function, one can
determine the latter from the former. Once each
individual's FE is known, we can estimate a
"hedonic" FE function by regressing PE(S) on
the characteristics, S:7
=a0 + a1S1+. . . + (3)
Herea,is the shadow value of attribute S.
Furthermore, once FE(S) and C(E, S) are
known, one can work backwards through the
model to obtain the wealth-maximizing level of
education, E*. Since C(E, 5) is strictly convex
and increasing in E, CE(E, S) is strictly increasing
in E and is therefore invertible with respect to E.
Thus,
E =CE1(CE,S).
At the wealth-maximizing level of education,





Thus, given a vector of attributes, (6) identifies
theirpossessor's wealth-maximizing level of
education.
It has beensuggested thatifcosts were more
'Thereis no necessity that this be a linear function, and in
the empirical analysis, various functional forms were tried.
None differed significantly from the linear form.
easily observed than returns, the latter could be
inferred from the former. Here, it is useful to
specify the cost function. This function is not an
estimated behavioral relationship but something
that can be determined a priori once tuition and
foregone earnings are known.
The primary cost of schooling consists of
foregone earnings. Until one enters college, it
can be argued that virtually all schooling costs
consist of foregone earnings. Assume, therefore,
that costs of grades one through twelve are sim-
ply the associated foregone earnings and that
direct costs for grades beyond twelve are one-
half the foregone earnings component. Then, the
present value of the cost of E years of schooling
is given by8
(7)
where F are the foregone earnings associated
with year j.Notethat the discount factor is as-
sumed to be the same across all individuals. The
only cost differences that are accounted for are
differences in foregone earnings across individ-
uals. If borrowing costs do differ across individ-
uals, the misstatement of the cost curve will lead
(4) to an overprediction of schooling levels for high
finance cost individuals and an understatement
for low cost ones.
The foregone earnings consist of hours spent in
school times the price of time. Let us approxi-
(5) mate hours spent in school by the following
linear relationship9 consistent with 25 hours per
week at grade ito 58 hours per week at grade 18:
H(J) =830+ 70j. (8)
This assumption was changed such that C(J, S) =1.5
J/ \J+5
FI' forall J. The results were not significantly l+rJ
This assumption was changed to HO) =÷ (830+ 70j).
The results were not qualitatively altered.
C(E,
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The price of time can be estimated. On the
margin, it is the opportunity wage that the indi-
vidual could have earned had he opted to work
during a given year. A wage function that in-
cludes years of schooling completed and the en-
dowment variables is specified 10
lnW69 = b0 + b1E69 + b2IQ + b3M + b4N
+ b5D+b6R + b7(Age) (9)
where
W69 is the hourly wage rate in 1969 in dollars
per hour and _____
Nis the number of members in the individ-
ual's family in 1966,
D is a dummy set equal to I for whites,
R is a dummy set equal to 1 if the residence
at age 14 was not in a Standard Metropoli-
tan Statistical Area (SMSA),
IQ is the score reported by the high school on
the most recent IQ test, and
M is the highest level of education completed
by the mother.
Using the estimates from equation (9) in table
1, the current expected price of time during yearj
is then''
=exp[—.1655 + .04196(j —1)
+ .01540(j + 5) + .00187(IQ)
+ .00775(M) —.01001(N)
+ .11286(D) —.11516(R)]. (10)












where C(E, S) is measured in present dollars.
The discount rate, at this point, is assumed to be
the same for all groups and equal to 10%. It
should be pointed out that equation (11) gives the
level of costs generated not only at the attained
level of schooling, but at any level of E that we
wish to consider for any individual. I.e., once the
endowment vector is specified, the cost of any
level of schooling may be computed.
One difficulty is that in order to obtain the
marginal costs necessary for equations (4), (5),
and (6), one must differentiate (11) with respect
to E. This yields a rather unwieldy expression as
the result of the awkward form of(11). However,
equation (11) can be approximated by a function
of much more manageable form. Suppose we
approximate (11) by the following function:
C(E, S) = rEYIQaMNSexp[OD + AR]. (12)
Then the optimization condition, equation (2),
becomes
Pg(IQ, M, N, D, R) = y-rE-1IQ'MN6
exp(OD + AR).(13)
Upon substituting (3) into (13) and solving for
the optimal E, we get
E*=[(a0 + a1IQ + a2M + a3N + a4D
+ ar,R)' .y,IQaM/3Ns
exp(OD + AR)]. (14)
Equation (14) identifies E* once the endowment
vector is specified. From (11), it is theoretically
possible to solve algebraically for (12) and to
express C(E, S) as the right-hand side of (12)
plus a remainder. This is an unnecessarily
difficult task. By specifying arbitrary vectors of
10 Other functions (and functional forms) were tried. Spe-
cifically, father's income, schooling squared, schooling-IQ in-
teractions, and a number of other endowment variables were
added. They did not enter significantly. Nor did coefficients
differ significantly between whites and nonwhites other than
the intercept. The reader should not be particularly disturbed
by the meaning of the price of time for young children and the
necessary extrapolation to estimate it. Since all individuals in
the sample have completed at least ninth grade, costs of
previous years of schooling, even if estimated incorrectly, are
approximately constant across individuals. Stated in other
terms, it is marginal cost that does the work in this model
rather than total cost; and marginal cost should be estimated
accurately by this method, even if total cost is not.
II Note that family income is absent from equation (10).
This is not necessary for identification. Even if family income
affected wages, we could still estimate the amount by which
our predictions of E were off due to capital imperfections,
i.e., nonwage considerations. What is important, however, is
that income did not enter the equation significantly. In par-
ticular, its coefficient was 0.00000362 with a standard error of
0.00000894. This implies an elasticity of 0.015 with a standard
error of 0.038. The upper bound of 95% confidence interval
on the income elasticity is therefore 0.092, which is small













[E, S], one can generate cost as defined in equa-
tion (11). Then, by using OLS, we can estimate
(12) where the left-hand side of (12) is the right-
hand side of (11). The parameters of (12) are
obtained directly from a regression of in C(E, S)
on the log of the right-hand side of(12). Note that
nothing behavioral has occurred so far.'2 We are
simply approximating one function by a more
manageable second function and asking the com-
puter to assist us in obtaining the parameters of
tpproximation. As the R2 approaches 1, the ap-
proximation becomes better. As can be seen in
equation (12), table 1, the R2 from this procedure
is 0.97, so the price we pay for a more manage-
able cost function is quite low.
To recap, in the preceding few paragraphs a
model is constructed that allows estimation of
the optimal (attained) level of schooling simply
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by knowing the endowment vector. That is, we
construct a non-linear reduced form equation
which appears as equation (14). This equation is
based on the assumption that all individuals face
the same borrowing costs. If individuals from
wealthy homes face lower borrowing costs than
those from poor families, E*as computed by (14)
will tend to be too high for the poor and too low
for the rich. If no systematic residual is ob-
served, we can conclude that the assumption that
individuals face the same borrowing cost is not
violated by the data.
II. Estimation
The data used for this analysis came from the
National Longitudinal Survey (1975) on young
men, 14—24 years old in 1966. These data are
described in detail elsewhere (see Griliches
(1976) or Lazear (1976)), but they consist of a
five-year study of about 5,000 males with infor-
mation provided on work history, education, and
family background. For the purposes of this
study, it was necessary that the individuals have
completed schooling. Therefore, all observations
were dropped for persons who were currently (in
1975) attending school.'3 Similarly, observations
were dropped for which there was incomplete
information on the relevant variables. Attained
schooling is defined as the highest grade of
schooling completed in 1975.
The first order of business is to estimate the
wage equation from which schooling costs are
derived. Since the wage that is relevant is the
wage during the individual's educational years,
the wage rate in 1969 among the nonstudent pop-
ulation was used. This reduces the number of
observations but yields a more appropriate de-
pendent variable in the wage equation. For all
other calculations, the larger sample derived
from the 1975 data was used. The results of the
wage equation estimation are found in equation
(9), table 1. Second, the cost function approxi-
mation is derived as equation (12) in table 1. The
arbitrary vectors [E, S] were generated by using
actual values found in the NLS, where E is the
level of schooling completed in 1975. No real
values were necessary, however. As can be seen,
13Thisintroduces the possibility of selection bias. By 1975,
however, most individuals in the sample had completed
school, so that the bias is likely to be small, at worst. See
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the fit is very good (R2 =.97)so that the continu-
ous and differentiable form of C(E, S) given by
the right-hand side of (12) is a good approxima-
tion to the unmanageable true cost which, as
equation (11), becomes the left-hand side of (12).
Finally, from (13), one can infer FE once attained
E75 is known for each individual. These values of
FE are then regressed on the endowment charac-
teristics to obtain the hedonic returns-to-school-
ing function. This appears as equation (3) in table
1. An errors-in-variables problem involved in the
estimation of (13) is discussed in an appendix
(available from the author upon request).
The model is now, complete. All parameters
are identified so that an estimated E* can be
obtained for all individuals from equation (14). If
the model gives unbiased predictions, one would
expect that the mean level of the difference be-
tween actual E75 and optimal E*, E75 —E*,
should be approximately zero (actually 0.081 as
the result of nonlinearities).'4 The first row of
Actually, the expected value of E69 —Etis slightly
greater than zero as a result of nonlinearization of the error
term. This is seen as follows:
From equation (4),
E75 =CR'(CE,S)
and from equation (5)
E= CE1(PE(S),S).
Estimates of E are obtained by substituting PR(S) for Ps(S)
in (5). Since CE =PR(S)+ a, we rewrite
E75 = C 1(+ a, S)
and
= CE'(PE,S).




table 2 reveals that (E75 —E*)equals 0.074 with
a standard error of 0.045. The sample mean does
not differ significantly from its expectation and
so, for the sample as a whole, numbers consis-
tent with unbiased predictions appear to be ob-
tained. Table 2 also tells us that for the sample as
a whole, (Ps) is 1,023 where PE is the predicted
value of FE from equation (3). Since the marginal
value of a year of education in present terms must
equal the marginal cost, the cost of the final year
of schooling is, in period zero dollars, 1,023. The
final year occurs, on average, at age 18, so the
age 18 dollar value of the cost =1,023et°18 =
$6,188.This indeed seems reasonable.
III. Rich versus Poor
Up to this point family income has not been
introduced explicitly. Other things constant, in-
dividuals from wealthy families have been
treated as if they were indistinguishable from
individuals from poor families. This feature en-
ters at two points. First, family income15 did not
E—yi1B \" —
P +
Since y =1.412,we can approximate E75 —E*by
E75
— (P+ €)2 —PE2,
(NB)




Usingestimates of €2 and yqBfromthe sample, one obtains
that
—E*).081.
Family income is defined as the median income of the
father's current occupation according to the 1960 Census.
This is more likely to reflect permanent income or parental




Size . E7 E E75 —E PR
Total 1,769 13.77 13.69 .074
(.045)
1,023
Low-Income Third 590 13.14 13.21 —.073
(.077)
973
Middle-Income Third 589 13.49 13.59 — .105
(.082)
1,023
High-Income Third 590 14.66 14.26 .403
(.076)
1,082
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.48 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
enter the wage equation (as an empirical fact
rather than as an assumption). This means that
there is no direct effect of family income on an
individual's foregone earnings and cost of school-
ing. Further, it was assumed that all individuals
faced the same interest rates throughout. Again,
if individuals with wealthy parents can finance
their education more cheaply than can those with
less wealthy parents, one would expect the
model to overpredict attained schooling levels
for the poor and underpredict them for the rich.
Otherwise stated, the model infers and predicts
returns by saying that they are equal to marginal
cost as measured in the absence of capital costs
differences. But given S, the amount that em-
ployers pay workers for additional schooling is
independent of workers' costs of acquiring it.
Thus, although the true marginal returns function
is the same, the true marginal cost functions
would differ in a way not picked up in the model.
This would result in a lower attained E75 than
predicted for the high cost individual and a higher
attained E75 than predicted for the lowest cost
group. Table 2 provides evidence on this point.
Specifically, (E75 —E*), themean of the differ-
ence between predicted "optimal" and actual
levels of schooling, differs slightly, but statisti-
callysignificantly,fromitsexpectation
(=0.081).E* overpredicts attained levels of
schooling for low-income individuals and under-
predicts attained levels for high-income groups.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that bor-
rowing costs are higher for individuals from low-
income families than for individuals from high-
income ones. Thus, the assumption that all indi-
viduals face the same borrowing costs can be
rejected at conventional levels of statistical
confidence. But the more important question is,
"How different are these borrowing costs across
groups?"
To get at this issue, the question must be
turned around. Suppose it is assumed that indi-
viduals who come from poor families do indeed
face higher borrowing rates than those from
wealthy homes. The situation would then be the
one illustrated in figure 2.
Consider two individuals, A and B, who are
similar in all respects except for family income.
Since they have the same characteristics,
PE(SA)IPOOT =PE(SA)IRjCh.That is, employers do not
care about background characteristics that do not




the poor individual stops at E where C(E,SA)IpOO,.
= PE(SA), andthe rich individual stops at ER. If E*
iscalculated for the poor using the assumed high
interest cost function, but the unique PR(S) func-
tion for both rich and poor, the expectation of
(E*)willequal E if borrowing cost is in fact
higher for the poor. Similarly, using the unique
PE(S) function, but the relatively low interest
cost function for the rich, the expectation of (E*)
will equal ER. If, on the other hand, the borrow-
ing rate is in fact the same for both groups and
equal to the assumed 10% of the rich, rich and
poor individuals will stop at ER. Using CE(E,
SA to estimate FE (SA) for the poor will yield
a PE (SA) that is too high for both groups (since
only one FE(S) function is estimated and it will
include some observations that measure too high
a value of FE). In fact, PE(SA) will, since it is a
weighted average, be smaller than CE(E, SA)Ipç,jr
but larger than CE(E, SA)IRjCh. In this case, if the E*
forthe poor is calculated using the high interest
cost curve, the expectation of E* will lie below ER.
But, for the rich, since FE is greater than true E,
E* will exceed ER. Then if the higher finance cost
assumption is correct, no systematic residuals
will be observed. If incorrect, '(E75 —E*)will be
positive for the poor and negative for the rich.
It is now necessary to respecify the cost func-
tion to reflect the wedge between lending and
borrowing rates for the poor. The cost of the
wedge depends upon the length of the repayment
period. Suppose that it is assumed that the entire
loan is paid back upon graduation. Then the cost
of financing the jth year of schooling in dollars of
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and 0.25 percentage points different as in columns
4, 5,and6 of table 3, respectively.
• It is only when the difference is assumed to be
one-tenth of one percentage point that we can no
longer reject the null hypothesis that the two
groups differ in borrowing cost. From the first
section (table 2), we can reject with 95%
confidence that the high-income and low-income
groups face the same level of borrowing costs. But
from table 3 we can reject with 95% confidence
that the spread is 0.25 percentage points or great-
er. Therefore, we are very certain about the
amount by which borrowing costs differ. They
differ by an amount greater than zero but less than
0.25 of a percentage point with 95% confidence.
The assumption that they differ by one-tenth of
one percentage point (column 7 of table 3) seems
for E ￿12to fit about exactly the expectation of (E75 —E*)
equal to 0.081 for all groups.
In an earlier version, a number of other findings
were reported. That analysis'7 is merely sum-
marized here:
f
One extension of the analysis considers some
or E > 12. differences that arise when the sample is stratified
(7') by race. The most important finding in this regard
is that when (PE) is calculated by racial group-
ings, (PE) =$1,043for whites and only $914 for
blacks. Thus, the return to the marginal year of
education for blacks is only 88% of that for whites.
This is consistent with previous findings by
Freeman (1974a) and Welch (1973). It is also
found, however, that holding other things con-
stant, blacks have higher optimal and actual levels
of education than whites. This is because the
lower returns to blacks are more than offset by the
lower costs.'8
Some of the specifications were altered in order
to test the robustness of the model. The most
important change was that the wage rate used in
the calculations was altered to include the value of
on-the-job training using the method of Lazear
(1976, l977a, and 1979). The main effect was an
increase in (I-'E);thebehavior of the residuals was
not significantly altered. I.e., the difference be-
tween implicit borrowing costs for rich and poor
remained very small.
16 Theactual figure is slightly less than one-third of the
sample since there were a number of families with the tertial
income level.
Available from the author upon request.
ISThisfinding is consistent with those of Freeman (1974b)
and Jencks(1972).
where rB is the borrowing rate. To convert this to
present value, the lending rate should be used for
discounting since it is at this rate that a dollar in
year zero is turned into (1 + rL)t dollars in year t
(by lending at that rate). Thus, the present value
of the loan cost is
F,(l+rB) =
(1+ rL)E+l
Ifr =rL,then this becomes F3(l/1 + rL)5 which
is what is given in equation (7). Thus, for individ-
uals from wealthy homes, cost is defined as in (7).
For those from the lowest one-third'6 of family





C(E,S) = (1+ rL)E5
E
+ 1.5 F,(l +rB)EJ
=i(1+rL)5
IV. Some Additional Results
Letting TL =0.10and rB vary from 0.10 to 0.15, the
values were substituted in and equations (12) and
(3) were re-estimated. Equation (12) was esti-
mated separately for the poorest one-third and
richest two-thirds since we are fitting different
cost functions. However, as explained above,
there is a unique PE(S)functionand therefore only
one equation (3). Using these estimates, E*is
calculated for each individual. The summary sta-
tistics are contained in table 3.
In column 3 of table 3, TB is assumed to be 0.15
for the low-income group and 0.10 for the higher
income group. As predicted, the mean of the re-
siduals is positive and large for the low-income
group and negative and large in magnitude for the
high-income group. This implies that we can re-
ject at all conceivable levels of statistical sig-
nificance that the borrowing costs to the poor are
five percentage points higher than they are to the
higher income group. The same is true when in-
terest rate differences are assumed to be 0.1, 0.5,50 THEREVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
This column uses separate cost functions so the results differ slightly from those found in table 2.
A second change was to respecify equation (11)
such that foregone earnings were assumed to be
zero during the first seven years of school (or
approximately until age twelve). The entire model
was re-estimated and all conclusions remained
intact. This is to be expected, since early foregone
earnings costs are quite unimportant in affecting
estimates of the marginal cost of schooling, which
drives most of the analysis.
Finally, in an earlier version, a different part of
the sample was used and E69wasthe relevant
variable rather than E75.Inaddition, the wage
equation was linear rather than log-linear. The
results in that draft are virtually indistinguishable
from those in this draft)9
V. Summary and Conclusion
This paper attempts to build a model of optimal
schooling acquisition based on the premise that
individuals are wealth-maximizers. By postulat-
ing a specific schooling cost function, one can
infer the marginal costs and therefore returns to
education. This return varies across individuals,
and the model allows estimation of these varia-
tions with respect to specified endowment vari-
ables.
The primary task of the framework is to ascer-
tain whether one's genetic and environmental en-
dowment affects the ability to obtain schooling. It
is easily established that endowment is important
as a schooling determinant because it affects
foregone earnings. The more subtle question,
however, is, "Are particular groups with given
endowments discriminated against by a capital
t9Availablefrom the author upon request.
market mechanism?" The answer to this question
appears to be, "Only very slightly." The assump-
tion that wealthy and less wealthy individuals bor-
row at the same rate does result in systematic
overprediction of the poorer individual's attained
schooling level. However, we can reject with 95%
confidencethat the difference between implicit
borrowing costs equals or exceeds one-quarter of
one percentage point.
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